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Abstract—The braid group is an important non commutative 
group, at the same time, it is an important tool in quantum field 
theory with better topological structure, and often used as a res-
earch carrier for anti-quantum cryptographic algorithms. This 
paper proposed a difficult problem on a positive braid semi-
group, and proved that the difficulty is not lower than the conju-
gate search problem. Based on this new difficult problem, we pr-
opose a new cryptosystem, which include a key exchange protocol 
and a public key encryption algorithm. Since our cryptosystem is 
implemented on a semi-group, it effectively avoids the analysis of 
attack algorithms on the cluster and makes our algorithm more 
secure. 
Keywords—Key exchange; semi-group; hard problem; quant-
um  computation; cryptosystem 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 The rapid development of quantum computers seriously
threatens the security of classical public key cryptosystems. In 
1994, Shor[1] proposed a quantum Fourier transform 
algorithm, which can construct an integer factorization 
polynomial (quantum) algorithm, which poses a substantial 
threat to the security of RSA. In 2003, Proos et al[2].extended 
the Shor algorithm to the elliptic curve, and obtained the 
polynomial (quantum) algorithm for solving the discrete 
logarithm problem over the elliptic curve, which poses a 
substantial threat to the security of ECC. Although quantum 
computation is still rapidly developing, almost all quantum 
algorithms can be uniformly attributed to the quantum Fourier 
transform on the commutative group. Moreover, these 
algorithms mainly attack the mathematics problems based on 
the commutative group, and they can't do anything about the 
non-commutative structure. 
Braid group is an important non-commutative group, 
there are many difficult problems on it, which is suitable for 
designing cryptographic systems, and therefore,  braid group 
is also used as a research carrier for anti-quantum 
cryptographic algorithms. Although some cryptographic 
algorithms on braid groups were attacked to varying degrees 
[3-7], according to research trends in the direction of anti-
quantum attack cipher in recent years, the cryptographic 
scheme based on braid group is still hot, and new results have 
been put forward continuously [8,9,10]. 
Based on complex network environment, to prevent the 
attacks of quantum computers, this paper focuses on the 
research of the resistance quantum key exchange protocol. 
The classic key exchange protocol on the braid group is the 
AAG protocol [11], later, in order to resist the "length atta-
ck" [16], it was modified to AAFG protocol [12]. The modi-
fied AAFG agreement did not give too much expectation, 
soon afterwards, Lee SJ, Lee, E[13] and Dehornoy[14] poi-
nted out that it was not safe enough. Diverse attack methods 
have caused many new schemes to be questioned quickly, 
resulting in almost no secure key exchange protocol on the 
braid group. Therefore, this paper will propose a new key 
exchange protocol to make up for this deficiency. 
Contributions: All of the positive braids in the braid 
group contribute a semi-group, we propose a new compu-
tational problem on this semi-group, called exchange deco-
mposition problem, it has been proved that the difficulty of 
this new problem is no less than the conjugate search probl-
em on braid groups. Finally, based on the assumption of this 
problem, we propose a secure key exchange protocol. 
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Definitions
 Braid group is an important non-commutative group, there 
are many applications over it. In the following we will briefly 
review some important concepts related to the research of the 
paper. More details refer to [17]. 
Definition 1 Define Bn as a braid group generated by 
121 ,, naaa " , and if  
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rated by the inverse of the generators and itself, which any 
sequence of it is a word on braid Bn.   
Definition 2 It is called positive braids, if a word does not 
contain its’ any inverse. All of the positive braids form a semi-
group, denoted as Bn+.  This is a very important semi-group, 
after the paper will describe a cryptographic algorithm in this 
semi-group. 
B. The fundamental braid and Normal form
In braid groups, both of words is the same if consisting of 
braids in the same way or through the above two points (1), (2)  
can be transformed into the same form. So we need a unified 
standard form. This paper will use the left normal form [17].  
Before introducing the standard type, we need to use  the 
fundamental braid. 
Definition 3 Let  Bn   be a braid group,  the fundamental braid 
is defined as follow: 
®¯­ ' '
 '
 1211
1
aaa
e
nnnn "
From the geometric point of view, it is a special braid, n
braids intertwined with each other, but any two braids cross-
ing only once. In case of confusion as' , the fundamental 
braid has many good properties. 
Theorem 1 niniin Baaa ' ' ˈ22
Theorem 2 [11] if 'd ns BDDthenA 21 ,,  s.t. 
21 ADAD
s   ' . 
 If the braid group in each word only expressed as a kind 
of form, this form is called the standard type, the introduce-
tion of standard type can help us to distinguish each braids are 
equal. This paper introduces left normal form [17] proposed 
by Garside. 
Theorem 3[17]  Any nBx  can be expressed as 
Zkssyx r
kk ' ' ,...1 ˈ ysss ii 111 )...( ' ,we defined 
the word r
k ssx ...1'  is  x’s left  normal form.
Deduction Any element ZmByBx nn   ,, , makes 
that mxy ' . 
Proof:  According to theorem 3, x can be expressed in this 
form  
r
kk ssAx !1' ' , while 0tr , x is a positive braid, it is 
easy to see that exist an element y in Bn+ , s.t. ' xy . While 
0r ˈ A  is a simple braid, we have 'dA ˈthen 
'   DAtsBD n ..,
So whatever 1t rn ˈfor 0tn ˈand ' nn BDy ˈ
1 ' '' 
'' 
rnrn
nr DAxy
There are many difficult problems on the braid group, 
which can be used in the design of public key cryptosystems. 
The literature [19] summarizes the characteristics and cone-
ctions of these issues in a more comprehensive way. Among 
them, the conjugate problem is a difficult problem which is 
widely studied. It is applicable to general non-exchange gro-
ups and is considered to be difficult to solve. The definition of 
the conjugate search problem as follow: 
Definition 4 (Conjugacy Search Problem) Given the values x 
and  y, find a braid s in braid group Bn such that 
1 sxsy
III. A NEW hard problem 
The design of public key cryptography is based on a 
difficult math problem. Now, we propose a new hard problem, 
called Exchange Decomposition Problem. 
Definition 5 (Exchange Decomposition Problem)  Given the 
values U and V  in semi-group Bn+, find two positive braids s 
and t such that : 
®¯­  
 
Vts
Ust
We will prove that the Exchange Decomposition Problem 
is at least as hard as the conjugate search problem.
Based on the above two hard problems(Conjugate Search 
Problem and Exchange Decomposition Problem), we propose 
the following two security assumptions:  
Assumption1  We assume that it is hard to compute s,t, given 
the values U and V  in  Bn, where st = U and ts = V.  
Assumption2  We assume that it is hard to compute s, given 
the values  x and  y, where  .
1 sxsy
Theorem 4 Assumption1 holds if and only if assumption 2 
holds. 
Proof 
 Assume that an adversary A attacks the assumption1, 
while another adversary B attacks the assumption2. What we 
need to do is to prove that  
(1) If A attacks successfully, then B attacks successfully. 
(2) If B attacks successfully, then A attacks successfully. 
For (1), if A attacks successfully, then the t and s can be 
computed by the  given  the values U and  V.  Assume that  
1261
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So we can compute s easily. 
For (2), if B attacks successfully, then the s can be computed 
by given the values x and y. Consider that   
®¯­  
 
Vts
Ust
We can see   
1,    tUtVthenVttUtst
1,    sVsUthensVUssts   
So we can compute s and t easily. 
In summary, the theorem is proved. 
The above has proved that difficulties of the two problems 
are the same on the braid group Bn , but there is no inverse of 
any element in a semi-group Bn +. Therefore, based on this new 
computing problem, we can put forward a better cryptographic 
algorithm in a semi-group. Next section, we will propose a 
cryptographic algorithm on positive braid semi-groups.
IV. KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL
The key exchange protocol is as follows: there are two 
parties, called Alice and Bob. They would like to agree on a 
common secret in such a way that an adversary observing the 
median values of communication cannot deduce any useful 
information about the secret they shared.  
A. AAG protocol 
 The public key consists of two sets of braids in Bn . The 
secret key of Alice is a word s and its inverses generated by a 
random function u , while the secret key of  Bob is a word t and 
its inverses generated by a random function v . The scheme is 
as follows [11]: 
gA computes the braid s = u(p1, ... , pl) , sends 1 ssqq ii , 
i = 1, ... , m to  B;
gB computes the braid r = u(q1, ... , qm), sends 1 rrpp ii ,
i = 1, ... , l to  A;
gA computes  )',,'( 1 lA ppust " ;
gB computes  11 )',,'(
 rqqvt mB " . 
The common key is tA = tB . 
It is easy to see that  
Bm
m
l
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The security is based on the difficulty of a variant to 
Conjugate Search Problem in Bn , namely the Multiple
Conjugate Search Problem, in which one tries to find a 
conjugating braid starting not from one single pair of conj-
ugate braids (p, p’), but from a finite family of such pairs 
)',( ii pp  obtained using the same conjugating braid [18].
B. A new key exchange protocol
Choose two sets of random braids
! lppp ,...,, 21  , and  ! mqqq ,...,, 21   
As the public key of Alice and Bob on semi-group Bn+ .
Alice and Bob use their own public key as parameters, then get 
their own private keys by the private key generators u, v, and 
private key generation is confidential. k and h are open and 
large enough to meet the experimental conditions. 
Perform the following steps:
Step1: Alice computes the positive braids ),...,( 1 lppus  ,
computes  nBs1 , where kss 21 '  , k is a public integer. 
Then, use  s, s1 to  compute  
missqq ii ,,1,1
' "  
and send ! ',...,',' 21 mqqq to Bob. 
Step2: Bob computes the positive braid ),...,( 1 lppvr  ,
computes  nBr1  , where hrr 21 '  , h is a public integer. 
Then, use  r, r1 to  compute  
.,1,1
' lirprp ii "  
and send ! ',...,',' 21 lppp to Alice. 
Step3: Alice computes )1(21
''
2
'
1 /),...,,(
' lkl spppuS .
Step4: Bob computes )1(2''2
'
11 /),...,,(
' mhmqqqvrT .
It is easy to see  
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This shows that the process allows Alice and Bob to obtain 
a common secret, S = T, and distribute the key safely, and 
enable users to create shared symmetric keys.
In formal terms, our agreement does not seem to be very 
different from the AAG protocol. In fact, they are essentially
different.
Group Hard Problem
AAG
protocol Braid group
Multiple Conjugate 
Search Problem
Our protocol Semi-group Exchange Decomposition Problem
All attack algorithms for AAG protocol are running on the 
group algorithm. However, our protocol is based on the semi-
group generated by the braid group Bn . In addition, it has been 
proved that the new problem which applied by the protocol is 
at least as hard as the conjugate search problem on the braid 
group. All of the elements in the semi-group are positive 
braids, there is no inverse, so it will resist more attacks.  
V. PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM
In the previous chapter, we proposed a new key exchange 
protocol that compares it with the AAG protocol and also 
makes a simple analysis of the protocol. By using the key 
exchange protocol by previous chapter, we construct a new 
public key encryption algorithm. Let knBH }1,0{: o  be an 
ideal that has function from the braid group to the message 
space.
1. Key Generation:  
(a) Choose two sets  sufficiently complicated braids  
! lppp ,...,, 21 , ! mqqq ,...,, 21 nB
(b)  Let d be a sufficiently complicated integer, choose a 
random function u , compute ),,,( 21 lpppus ! , 1s ,
where  dss 21 ' , then compute missqq ii ,,1,' 1 !  . 
(c) The public key  pk  is  
),,,',,',( 11 !! mm qqqqd "" , 
where missqq ii ,,1,' 1 !  ; 
         The secret key sk  is ),( 1ss . 
2. Encryption: Given a message km }1,0{  and pk . 
(a) Choose a random function v , compute 
    ),,( 1 mqqvr " , 1r , where trr 21 ' , then compute 'ip ,
where lirprp ii ,,1,' 1 "  ; 
(b) Set '||'' 21 lpppY " , )1(211 /)',,'( ' mdmqqvrZ " ; 
(c) Compute )(),,( mEcZYHk k  , the cipher text  
),( cY . 
3. Decryption: Given a cipher text ),( cY  and  sk ,  compute 
)(,),(,/)',,'( )1(211 cDmZYHksppuZ k
lt
l   ' " . 
Compared to the PKC proposed by Ko et al.[19] , our 
algorithm does not need to construct a commutative subgroup. 
Because of the non-commutativity of the positive braids, our 
encryption algorithm can better resist the quantum Fourier’s 
attack. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, firstly, we introduced the research status of 
the cryptosystem based on the braid group and the basic conc-
epts of the braid group. Then, a new computational problem 
was proposed, and proved that the problem is at least as hard as 
the conjugate search problem over the braid group. Finally, we 
proposed a new key exchange protocol and construct a new pu-
blic key encryption. In fact, our cryptosystem is implemented 
in a semi-group, which makes many of the attacks in the past 
will no longer work. Therefore, the new cryptosystem is more 
secure. 
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